LOSSES ON SALES OR EXCHANGES BETWEEN
MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY:
THE IN-LAW PROBLEM
of property may generally
be deducted in computing taxable income,' certain losses were specifically made non-deductible under section 24 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 19392 and are likewise non-deductible under section 267 of
the new 1954 Code.3 These sections disallow as deductions, among
other things, losses on sales or exchanges transacted between members
of the same family.4 The intent of Congress in this respect is clarified
by its definition of "family"' which does not include in-laws.'
The recent case of Stern v. Commissioner raised the interesting
problem of whether a sale to a son-in-law could, nevertheless, be regarded as a sale within the family for this purpose because of the peculiar form which the transaction took. At the son-in-law's suggestion,
title to the petitioner's former residence had been taken by the sonin-law and his wife, petitioner's daughter, as tenants by the entirety.
The purchase check had been drawn on their joint bank account, but all
funds therein were attributable to the son-in-law, and the daughter
had not participated in any of the negotiations other than to join as a
co-signer of the purchase-money mortgage.8 The Commissioner argued,
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nevertheless, that the joinder of the two as tenants by the entirety transformed the transaction from a sale to the son-in-law into a sale to the
daughter.
The Tax Court9 sustained the Commissioner's argument by holding
non-deductible the entire loss sustained by the father in the transaction. 10 The Third Circuit, however, reversed, holding that, although
traditional realty law espoused the fiction that man and wife are a
single person, the tax law should be governed by practical realities. The
important point, therefore, was who, as a matter of fact, was the purchaser." And looking to the questions of who negotiated the sale and
who paid for the property, the court, with no difficulty, concluded that
the son-in-law was in fact the buyer. '
The problem presented by the Stern case-whether and to what
extent losses sustained in sales or exchanges with in-laws are deductible
for tax purposes-would seem to be susceptible of three possible solutions. The entire loss can be held non-deductible on the ground that
the transaction is actually a sale, albeit indirectly, by the taxpayer to
another member of his family. Or the loss can be disallowed as a deduction proportionately to the interest the relative takes in the property.
Or lastly, the entire loss can be held deductible on the ground that the
relative is, if anything, a donee if he neither takes a part in, nor contributes consideration to, the transaction.
Disallowance of the entire loss, the first solution, can rest on either
or both of two bases. First, if the relative of the taxpayer has, in fact,
negotiated the sale and furnished all of the consideration, then the
transaction is actually a sale to that relative, and the court should
treat it as such regardless of the form in which it is cast.
Another basis on which total disallowance can be posited is an outright acceptance of the real property fiction that tenants by the entirety
(where price paid came out of -wife's separate funds,
412, 103 S.W. 8 (1907)
husband's interest subject to a constructive trust in her favor).
021
T.C. 155 (1953).
"0The Tax Court disallowed the loss under § 24 (b) of the 1939 Code, since a
tenancy by the entirety confers on each grantee ownership of the whole property and
not just a part. See also Simister v. Comm'r, 4 T.C. 470 (1944.)5 note 15 and accompanying text infra.
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Comm'r, 77 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1935). But cf. Comm'r v. Hale, 67 F.2d 56i (ist
Cir. 1933). See also Note, 55 HARV. L. REV. 872 (942).
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hold the land as one person, and that, therefore, the entire property has
been sold to the relative.13 This point of view, adopted by the Tax
Court in the Stern case, ignores the realities of the transaction, however, and, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals, it is doubtful that
the solution of modern tax problems will be greatly enhanced by the
invocation of abstract concepts of medieval property law.1 4 In cases
such as Stern, therefore, the choice would seem more properly to have
lain between the other two alternative solutions, depending upon the
circumstances involved.
Accordingly, if the daughter in the Stern case had furnished a part
of the consideration or had been instrumental in the negotiations which
eventuated in the sale, then the Third Circuit might have held that the
property was sold to the daughter to the extent that she had contributed
a quid pro quo, and, to that extent, the loss should have been denied as
a deduction. If, for example, the value of the daughter's interest, as
measured by the amount she had contributed to its purchase, amounted
to two-thirds of the total value of the property, then two-thirds of the
loss should have been disallowed. This approach is suggested in part
by Simister v. Commissioner,:5 where a father sold a farm at a loss to
his daughter and son-in-law as tenants in common. The court there held
that the prohibition against deducting a loss on a family sale applied
only to the half of the property taken by the daughter, but not to that
half passing to the son-in-law, and allowed one-half of the loss to be
deducted. 6 It will be noted, however, that though apportionment was
accepted in this case as a solution, the amount apportioned to each party
for tax purposes was determined by the tenancy-in-common concept of
an undivided one-half interest rather than by the amount-of-contribution test suggested above. It is submitted that the latter test is better
grounded in consistency and good sense.
The last of the three possible solutions-allowance of the entire loss
as a deduction-would seem to be appropriate only in cases where the
relative has contributed nothing, directly or indirectly, to the trans13

See note io supra; Rudick, Federal Tax Problems Relating to Property Owned in

Joint Tenancy and Tenancy by the Entirety, 4 TAx L. REv. 3 (1948).
"Judge Marls, speaking for the Court of Appeals (25 F.2d 701, 705), quoted
with approval Judge Hill's dissenting opinion in the Tax Court: "[T]he majority
relies upon legal fiction in the effort to establish that a sale between the petitioner and
his daughter was accomplished as a matter of law. The fiction relied upon belongs to
the law of real property. It had its roots in the common law and was born centuries
before income taxation was a gleam in the fiscal eye of government. The fiction argues
that husband and wife are one. In the enactment and administration of revenue laws,
fact rather than fiction is made to prevail."
154 T.C. 470 (1944). See note io supra.
"Cf. Morgan v. Finnegan, 182 F.zd 649 (8th Cir. x95o).
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action and so is actually a donee rather than a purchaser. Thus, ifa
son-in-law, as in the Stern case, has actually furnished the entire consideration for a purchase from his father-in-law and has simply taken
title in his name and that of his wife, it cannot fairly be said that there
has been a "sale" to the daughter. In substance, there has been an instantaneous gift to her of the interest she takes in the property. Such,
in fact, appears to have been the situation in the Stern case, and, accordingly, the decision of the Third Circuit allowing deduction of the entire
loss would seem to be sound.
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